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ABSTRACT
The Internet is by all accounts an incredible success, but in
spite or maybe because of this success, its deficiencies have
come under increasing scrutiny and triggered calls for new
architectures to succeed it. Those architectures will, how-
ever, face a formidable incumbent in the Internet, and their
ability to ultimately replace it is likely to depend equally
on technical superiority as on economic factors. The goal
of this paper is to start developing models that can help
provide a quantitative understanding of a competition be-
tween the Internet and a new system, and show what factors
affect it most strongly. A model for the adoption of compet-
ing network technologies by individual users is formulated
and solved. It accounts for both the intrinsic value of each
technology and the positive externalities derived from their
respective numbers of adopters. Using this model, different
configurations are explored and possible outcomes character-
ized. More importantly, configurations are identified where
small differences in the attributes of either technology can
lead to vastly different results. The paper provides initial
results that can help identify parameters that significantly
affect the likelihood of success of new network technologies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.1.0 [Information Systems]: Models and Principles—
General
General Terms
Economics, Management
Keywords
Technology Adoption, Technology Diffusion, User Hetero-
geneity, Network Externality
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1. INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology often see newer and better solu-
tions replacing older ones. Networking is no exception, and
the Internet displaced the traditional phone network as the
de facto communication infrastructure, for example. And it
also displaced more direct competitors, packet data network
technologies such as ATM, Frame Relay, SNA and others.
But this displacement took a long time. In other words,
technical superiority alone is no guarantee for success, espe-
cially in the presence of a strong incumbent. A large body
of work has indeed been devoted to this issue, but network-
ing technologies exacerbate this phenomenon because of the
many factors that affect their value, and in particular the
benefits of a large installed base. The Internet itself pro-
vides a perfect example of such complex interactions, with
its long-standing“migration”from IPv4 to IPv6. In spite of a
known need (the eventual exhaustion of IPv4 addresses) and
intrinsic technical advantages (security, mobility, etc.), un-
certainties regarding technology maturity and stability and
difficulties in ensuring a transparent transition for existing
services, have stymied all large-scale conversion attempts.
Could this have been predicted, and were there steps that
could have been taken to remedy the situation and hasten a
transition that most if not all view as positive and ultimately
necessary? In this paper, we propose a model to study both
the dynamics of diffusion of new network technologies in the
presence of an incumbent, and their eventual equilibrium
adoption levels.
We start with a model of individual user’s utility and build
an aggregate diffusion model that is consistent with individ-
ual rational decision-making in adopting network technolo-
gies. In our model, users can be heterogeneous in the way
they value the services deployed on top of any network tech-
nology. The drawback of modeling individual level decision-
making and user heterogeneity is that it makes the diffusion
model complex. However, the cost of this complexity is out-
weighed by two benefits. First, the model allows us to un-
derstand both individual-level and system-level dynamics,
and explore how small changes in system parameters can
affect individual decisions and ultimately lead to very dif-
ferent system-level outcomes. Second, the model allows us
to identify and explain interesting phenomena such as the
presence of multiple equilibria and the potential for both
network technologies to coexist.
Although preliminary, we have four main findings to re-
port from our initial analysis:
• In many instances, multiple equilibrium adoption lev-
els may exist for the same set of parameters (i.e., price,
quality levels, etc). The specific equilibrium attained
depends on the initial condition for the diffusion pro-
cess. Stated differently, the equilibrium adoption levels
depend on entry timing of the new network technology.
• It is possible for both the incumbent and entrant tech-
nologies to coexist in equilibrium, even in the absence
of gateways or converters.
• Even though the entrant may seem to be diffusing well,
it is often doomed to fail if its growth rate is slower
than that of the incumbent. Thus, the observer can
be misled by the apparent steady pace of diffusion of
a new network technology, and should closely monitor
relative growth rates and network benefits.
• When multiple equilibria exist, we observe that small
changes in parameters can sometimes have a big im-
pact on the equilibrium adoption levels. Thus, decision
makers have to be particularly cautious with pricing,
entry timing and other deployment decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses prior work and positions our work in the literature.
Section 3 introduces our model and problem formulation.
Section 4 characterizes equilibrium adoption levels, while
Section 5 provides a numerical study of diffusion dynamics
involving two competing network technologies. We discuss
the limitations of this study and conclude the paper with
remarks on future work in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
There are two streams of work relevant to our study. The
first relates to the literature on adoption of incompatible
technologies. The second relates to the literature on new
product/technology diffusion. We discuss both below.
Adoption of incompatible technologies: Adoption of
incompatible technologies in the presence of network exter-
nalities has been treated in a number of prior works, e.g., [4,
3]). When technologies are incompatible, users of a technol-
ogy can only reach other users of the same technology and,
as a result, the value a user derives from a technology is a
function of the size of its installed base (these are referred
to as network benefits or network externalities). The main
focus of the literature has been on the impact of converters
that help make one technology partially compatible with
the other. The key finding of these works is that network
externalities can often lead to multiple equilibria and that
converters have a significant impact on equilibrium adoption
levels. A recent paper by Joseph et al. [7] extends the results
in the context of new network architectures. These papers
consider static models and do not model the exact conver-
gence path that leads to any equilibrium. As a result, they
do not allow the observer to infer how the diffusion process
selects one of several equilibria and also make it difficult to
devise dynamic policies.
New Product Diffusion: Modeling the diffusion of new
products and technologies has a long tradition in Market-
ing [1] and is still an active area of research (see [8] for an
overview of this literature). The vast majority of these mod-
els focus on aggregate adoption dynamics without explicitly
modeling individual decision making processes. The advan-
tage of the approach is that it results in relatively simple
diffusion models that can then be used to study dynamic
policies (e.g., dynamic pricing). Unfortunately, these ag-
gregate models do not shed sufficient light on the decision
processes that lead to certain system dynamics or the exact
mechanism through which various decision variables (pric-
ing, quality, advertising, etc.) impact adoption decisions. A
few models have focused on individual-level adoption (for ex-
ample [2, 6]). These models provide far greater insight into
the mechanism through which rational individual decision-
making results in aggregate system dynamics. Given the
complexity of these models, much of the progress to date
has been in settings with one single technology. In contrast,
the adoption of new network technologies and architectures
is often influenced by the presence of incumbents. In order
to fully understand the drivers of their success and failures,
it is important to model the role of the incumbent.
Prior work reveals two themes. First, while the litera-
ture on adoption of incompatible technologies has modeled
network externalities and demonstrated it can result in mul-
tiple equilibria, these models are static and do not provide
deep insight on the convergence process or path. Two, the
diffusion literature has primarily focused on aggregate mod-
els and the few individual-level models have been for sin-
gle technologies diffusing in isolation. Because new network
architectures are often deployed in the presence of incum-
bents, understanding diffusion of new network architectures
requires that we model dynamic processes and incorporate
the role of incumbents. This is the question we turn to now.
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section introduces our model for studying adoption
dynamics between two competing network technologies.
3.1 User’s Decision Process
Consider two network technologies, labeled 1 and 2, rep-
resenting the incumbent and entrant respectively: for exam-
ple, IPv4 versus IPv6 or the current Internet versus a clean-
slate alternative. The quality of technology i is denoted by
qi > 0 and its price pi > 0, for i = 1, 2. We assume a fixed
population of N users, with Ni the number of users adopt-
ing technology i = 1, 2. The proportion of users who adopt
technology i is denoted by xi =
Ni
N
, with x = (x1, x2) ∈ S,
where
S = {(x1, x2) | x1 + x2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1}
denotes the set of possible adoption levels. An end user’s
surplus from technology i is modeled as
Ui(θ, x) = θqi + v(xi)− pi (1)
θqi is the standalone benefit that the user obtains from tech-
nology i, with θ ∈ [0, 1] being an individual preference pa-
rameter that reflects how much the user values the tech-
nology. The value of θ varies across users capturing their
heterogeneity. Individual values of θ are private, but their
distribution, denoted by F (θ), is known. v(xi) ≥ 0 denotes
the positive network externalities or benefits that the user
derives from other adopters of technology i. These bene-
fits increase with the number of adopters, so that v(xi) is
a nondecreasing function with v(0) = 0. There exist sev-
eral techniques to estimate the user-specific weights in util-
ity functions (e.g., θ in our model). One highly appealing
option is the use of conjoint analysis. In conjoint analysis,
survey respondents are presented with options that simul-
taneously vary two or more attributes of a product/service
and are asked to indicate their preferences among these op-
tions. Respondents’ preference orderings are then used to
estimate the utility weights. We refer the interested reader
to [5] for a detailed survey.
We assume each user is a rational decision maker in that
she chooses technology i only if it provides a surplus that is
both positive (Individual Rationality constraint) and higher
than that of the other technology (Incentive Compatibility
constraint). In other words, a user chooses8<: no technology if Ui < 0 for all i,technology 1 if U1 > 0 and U1 > U2,technology 2 if U2 > 0 and U2 > U1.
To determine the number of adopters of the two technolo-
gies, we characterize indifference points that identify user
preference values associated with changes in their decision
to adopt either technology. Specifically, θ0i (x), i ∈ {1, 2} de-
note thresholds where users switch from deriving negative
surplus to deriving positive surplus from technology i, i.e.,
for a given x, θ0i (x) is a point such that Ui(θ
0
i , x) = 0. Simi-
larly, θ12(x) corresponds to the threshold where users switch
from preferring technology 1 to preferring technology 2, i.e.,
θ12(x) satisfies U1(θ
1
2, x) = U2(θ
1
2, x). By definition, any user
with preference value θ > θ0i derives positive surplus from
technology i. And a user with θ > θ12 derives greater surplus
from technology 2 than technology 1 (assuming q2 > q1).
Given these definitions, consider the following two subsets
of users defined in [0,1],
Θ1(x) = {θ ∈ [0, 1] | U1(θ, x) ≥ U2(θ, x), U1(θ, x) > 0},
Θ2(x) = {θ ∈ [0, 1] | U2(θ, x) > U1(θ, x), U2(θ, x) > 0}.
Under the assumption that the functions Ui(θi, x), i = 1, 2,
are continuous, both subsets are easily shown to be con-
nected intervals, so that if we denote as Hi(x), i = 1, 2, the
number of users in each subset, and further assume that F (θ)
is continuous, we have the following expression for Hi(x)
Hi(x) = F (bi)− F (ai)
where [ai, bi] = closure of Θi(x).
Equilibrium adoption levels can then be characterized by:
x∗i = Hi(x
∗) for i = 1, 2. (2)
In other words, at equilibrium, the number of users for whom
it is individually rational and incentive compatible to choose
technology i equals the current number of adopters of tech-
nology i. Based on this formulation, our goal is to char-
acterize, as a function of the exogenous system parameters
pi, qi, i = 1, 2, the equilibrium adoption levels, i.e., the fixed
points of Eqn. (2), and the dynamics leading to them.
3.2 Diffusion dynamics
Characterizing the dynamics of technology adoption to-
wards equilibrium, calls for defining the decision making
process of users. Suppose that at time ‘t’, the “current”
technology adoption values, xi(t), i = 1, 2, are announced
to all users. Assuming this information is available to the
entire population, each user could individually evaluate her
utility for the two technologies and immediately make the
corresponding adoption decision. Under these assumptions,
(Hi(x(t))−xi(t)) would be the proportion of users that pro-
ceed to adopt(disadopt) technology i at t. Users’ adoption
decisions may, however, be delayed for a number of reasons;
e.g., not all users may learn the current adoption levels at
the same time and they may react to this information at dif-
ferent rates. In order to capture these effects, the diffusion
rate of user decisions at time t can be modeled by
dxi(t)
dt
= (Hi(x(t)− xi(t))P (t) (3)
where P (t) is the expected conditional probability that an
individual who has not yet adopted technology i will do so at
time t. P (t) is analogous to the hazard rate in individual-
level diffusion models (e.g., see [6]). We assume that the
propensity of individuals to adopt does not change with
time, i.e., P (t) = γ. With this assumption, the diffusion
rate at time t is given by:
dxi(t)
dt
= γ
`
Hi(x(t))− xi(t)
´
, i ∈ {1, 2}. (4)
One aspect of our model needs further clarification. Specif-
ically, the model identifies the rate of technology adoption,
but not which users are making the change. To preserve con-
sistency with user preferences, we assume that in our target
population the users that are the first to adopt (or disadopt)
technology i are those that stand to benefit the most from
it. This ensures that at all times the sets of users having
adopted either technology are consistent, and correspond to
blocks of users with contiguous preferences.
4. CHARACTERIZING EQUILIBRIA
As outlined in the previous section, the dynamics of tech-
nology adoption in our model involve both identifying pos-
sible equilibria and characterizing how they are reached.
We start by exploring the first aspect as specified through
Eqn. (2), and for that purpose introduce the following as-
sumptions:
• θ has a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. This assump-
tion is for tractability and is common in the literature.
Although it affects the magnitude of the equilibrium,
it does not qualitatively affect the results [2].
• v(xi) is linear in xi, i.e., v(xi) = xi. This is consis-
tent with Metcalfe’s law and commonly used in the
literature (e.g., [4]). Note that the maximum network
benefit is normalized to 1 and all other benefits and
costs are expressed in the same unit.
• The entrant technology is of higher quality, i.e., q2 >
q1. In other words, the technical superiority of tech-
nology 2 affords its users greater intrinsic benefits.
• pi > 0, qi > 0, i = 1, 2.
4.1 Identification of Hi(x)
Recall from Eqn. (2) that equilibria are determined by
the functions Hi(x), i = 1, 2, which themselves depend on
the values of the indifference points identifying the prefer-
ence levels at which users derive positive utility from either
technology (θ0i (x), i = 1, 2) and prefer technology 2 over
technology 1 (θ12(x) – recall our assumption that q2 > q1).
The corresponding conditions are given by
Ui(θ, x) > 0 if θ > θ
0
i (x) (5)
U2(θ, x) > U1(θ, x) if θ > θ
1
2(x). (6)
Table 1: Partitions characterizing Hi(x)
θ01 ≥ θ02 θ01 < θ02
Region condition Region condition
R1 θ
0
2 ≤ 0 R4 θ12 ≤ 0, 0 ≤ θ01
R2 0 < θ
0
2 < 1 R5 0 < θ
1
2 < 1, θ
0
1 ≤ 0
R3 1 ≤ θ02 R6 0 < θ12 < 1, 0 < θ01 < 1
R7 1 ≤ θ12, θ01 ≤ 0
R8 1 ≤ θ12, 0 < θ01 < 1
R9 1 ≤ θ12, 1 ≤ θ01
Eqn. (5) indicates that any user with θ > θ0i gets positive
surplus from adopting technology i, and Eqn. (6) implies
that she prefers technology 2 over technology 1 if θ > θ12
and prefers technology 1 otherwise.
Setting Ui(θ, x) = 0, we get
θ01(x) =
p1 − x1
q1
(7)
θ02(x) =
p2 − x2
q2
(8)
Similarly, setting U1(θ, x) = U2(θ, x) gives
θ12(x) =
(x1 − x2) + (p2 − p1)
(q2 − q1) . (9)
To simplify notation, we use from now on θ0i and θ
1
2 instead
of θ0i (x) and θ
1
2(x). After simple manipulations, we get
θ12 − θ01 = q2
q2 − q1 (θ
0
2 − θ01),
θ12 − θ02 = q1
q2 − q1 (θ
0
2 − θ01)
and have the following result about the location of θ12.
Lemma 4.1. If θ01 < θ
0
2, then θ
1
2 > θ
0
2 > θ
0
1. If θ
0
1 ≥ θ02,
then θ12 ≤ θ02 ≤ θ01.
Using the above lemma, we obtain expressions for Hi(x):
H1(x) =

[θ12][0,1] − [θ01][0,1] if θ01 < θ02
0 otherwise
(10)
H2(x) =

1− [θ12][0,1] if θ01 < θ02
1− [θ02][0,1] otherwise
where x[a,b] is the projection of x into the interval [a, b], i.e.,
is equal to x inside and either a or b outside. As the prefer-
ence levels θ of all users lie in [0, 1], Eqn. (10), fully deter-
mine Hi(x), albeit with possibly different expressions based
on the outcome of the projections. Hence, our next step is
to partition the (x1, x2) plane into regions where Hi(x) has
a unique expression. Although somewhat tedious, this can
be readily achieved from combining Eqns. (7) to (9) with
Eqn. (10). The resulting partitioning is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 that identifies nine distinct regions. These regions are
further characterized in Table 1 in terms on their boundaries
expressed as conditions on the indifference points. Armed
with explicit, albeit multiple (one per region) expressions for
Hi(x), we can solve Eqn. (2) and identify equilibria.
4.2 Computing equilibria
The computation of equilibria proceeds in two steps. The
first involves identifying candidate equilibria from solving
Eqn. (2) in each of the nine regions where it takes poten-
tially different expressions. The second consists of validating
Figure 1: Partitions
Table 3: Conditions for a valid equilibrium
candidate conditions
(0,0) p1 − q1 > 0 and p2 − q2 > 0
(1,0) p1 ≤ 1 and (q2 − p2)− (q1 − p1) ≤ 1
(0,1) p2 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p1 − p2 q1q2 +
q1
q2
( p1−q1
1−q1 , 0) max{0, p1 − q1} <
p1−q1
1−q1 < min{p1, 1}
q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1) < p1−q11−q1
(0, p2−q2
1−q2 ) max{0, p2 − q2} <
p2−q2
1−q2 < min{p2, 1}
1
q2
( p2−q2
1−q2 ) ≥
p2
q2
− p1
q1
x∗R5
max{p1, 1−(p2−p1)2 } < x∗1R5
x∗1R5 < min{1,
1−(p2−p1)+q2−q1
2
}
x∗R6 0 < x
∗
1R6
≤ min{p1, 1}, 0 < x∗2R6
these candidate equilibria by determining if they indeed be-
long to the region associated with the expression of Hi(x)
used to compute them. The results of the first phase of
this computation are reported in Table 2 for each region, to-
gether with the corresponding expressions for Hi(x). Note
the simple expressions for Hi(x), which imply that the dif-
ferential equation of Eqn. (4) can be readily solved to char-
acterize the dynamics of technology adoption. For ease of
notation in Table 2, we denote the candidate equilibrium in
R5 by x
∗
R5
= (x∗1R5 , 1 − x∗1R5) and the candidate in R6 by
x∗R6 = (x
∗
1R6
, x∗2R6). The specific values are:
x∗1R5 =
p2 − p1 − 1
q2 − q1 − 2 (11)
x∗1R6 =
q2
q1
p1 − p2 + 1− p1q1
q1 + 1 +
q2
q1
− q2 − 1q1
(12)
x∗2R6 = 1−
p1
q1
+
„
1
q1
− 1
«
x∗1R6 . (13)
The second step of the computation, validating the equilib-
ria listed in Table 2 by verifying that they belong to their
respective region, can be carried out using again Eqns. (7)
to (9) together with the conditions specified in Table 1. The
resulting list of valid equilibria together with the conditions
required for these validations are provided in Table 3. To
illustrate how these conditions can be derived, we briefly
sketch the process for x∗R5 . For x
∗
R5
to be an equilibrium, it
should satisfy
C1 : x1 + (p2 − p1)− (q2 − q1) < x2 < x1 + (p2 − p1)
C2 : x1 ≥ p1.
Using the expression for x∗1R5 given in Eqn. (11) in condi-
tions C1 and C2 yields the conditions given in Table 3.
Table 2: Candidate equilibria
Region H1(x) H2(x) Candidate x
∗
R1
H1(x) = 0
H2(x) = 1 (0, 1)
R2 H2(x) = 1− p2−x2q2 (0,
p2−q2
1−q2 )
R3 H2(x) = 0 (0, 0)
R4 H1(x) = 0 H2(x) = 1 (0, 1)
R5 H1(x) =
p2−p1−(x2−x1)
q2−q1 H2(x) = 1−
p2−p1−(x2−x1)
q2−q1 (x
∗
1R5
, 1− x∗1R5)
R6 H1(x) =
p2−p1−(x2−x1)
q2−q1 −
p1−x1
q1
H2(x) = 1− p2−p1−(x2−x1)q2−q1 (x
∗
1R6
, x∗2R6)
R7 H1(x) = 1
H2(x) = 0
(1,0)
R8 H1(x) = 1− p1−x1q1 (
p1−q1
1−q1 , 0)
R9 H1(x) = 0 (0,0)
Table 3 not only identifies valid equilibria, but it also in-
dicates that there exist conditions under which both tech-
nologies can coexist in equilibrium. It is interesting to note
that this is realized without the presence of converters. In
contrast, in a similar scenario without converters, [7] finds
that only one technology exists in equilibrium and that there
exists a tipping point where one technology takes over the
market. This is because their model assumes a homogeneous
population of users. Heterogeneity in the user population
adds complexity but highlights a finding of potential interest
to a policy maker, namely, that there are many cases where
both technologies can survive. When cast in the context of
network technologies, this can mean significant inefficiencies
if it calls for introducing and maintaining two versions of
new and existing service, e.g., an IPv4 and an IPv6 version.
Clearly, the availability of gateways, something we plan to
incorporate next, will affect this conclusion. However, cum-
bersome or expensive gateways, as is currently the case be-
tween IPv4 and IPv6, should introduce little changes, and
as shown in [7], the availability of gateways can both hasten
or slow-down the deployment of a new technology.
It should be noted that while Table 3 identifies valid equi-
libria, it does not specify which one is selected for combina-
tions of parameters that satisfy more than one of the validity
conditions specified in the table. Exploring this aspect to-
gether with the extent to which different outcomes can be
realized through small changes in configuration parameters
is a topic we explore further in the next section.
5. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION DYNAMICS
This section investigates several scenarios that illustrate
the broad range of dynamics and outcomes that the model
allows us to elucidate. Throughout the section, technology
1 is the incumbent and technology 2 the entrant, which as
we recall is assumed to be of higher quality, i.e., q2 > q1.
Because of the wide range of parameter combinations that
can be considered, we focus our investigation on scenarios
of most practical interest. Specifically,
• 0 < x1(0−) < x∗1only and x2(0−) = 0, where x∗1only is
a “stable” equilibrium if only technology 1 exists in the
market. In other words, technology 1 alone would sur-
vive but has not yet achieved its equilibrium penetra-
tion at t = 0, which is when technology 2 is introduced
with a penetration level of 0.
• When technology 2 is introduced at time t = 0, it is
priced so that it can start gaining market share. In
other words, θ02(x1(0
−), 0) < 1 and θ12(x1(0
−), 0) < 1,
which then implies p2 < q2 and p2 − p1 − (q2 − q1) <
−x1(0−), respectively.
Note that from Table 3, p2 < q2 implies that (0, 0) is not a
valid equilibrium. Hence, our choice of pi and qi ensures that
at least one of the two technologies survives at equilibrium.
Our first investigation highlights sensitivity to pricing of
technology 2. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 2, we
see that for the same values of p1 = 1.01, q1 = 2.95 and
q2 = 5.5, minor differences in p2 result in drastically differ-
ent outcomes that range from either technology being the
sole survivor (left and right-most curves), to both technol-
ogy coexisting in equilibrium (center curve). Of particular
interest is the fact that all three scenarios appear qualita-
tively very similar, i.e., with both technologies experienc-
ing healthy growth after the introduction of technology 2.
These qualitative similarities notwithstanding, differences in
growth rates between the two technologies are responsible
for the vastly different end-results.
The existence of a pricing combination that allows both
technologies to survive is also of interest, as is the fact that
price alone, and not the initial penetration of technology
1, determines the outcome in these examples. Finally, it
is also worth pointing out that in the scenario where tech-
nology 2 eventually eliminates technology 1, this result is
realized at the cost of a lower overall market penetration
than feasible with technology 1 alone. In other words, the
higher quality but higher price technology failed to attract
some of the“low-valuation”users. Further reduction in tech-
nology 2’s price can help increase its penetration among the
low-valuation users. This may or may not be profitable.
Our second example, shown in Figure 3, identifies a sce-
nario (p1 = 1.2, q1 = 2.95, q2 = 5.1 and p2 = 2.55), where
unlike Figure 2, the final equilibrium depends on the pen-
etration of technology 1 when technology 2 is introduced.
This highlights that when technology 2 is marginally more
attractive than technology 1, network externalities can be
dominant in determining the outcome. Thus, the timing of
introduction of technology 2 can be crucial in deciding its
eventual success. As in Figure 2, both scenarios start with
qualitatively similar behaviors, which makes it that much
harder for the policy maker to predict the evolution of tech-
nology adoption, unless careful attention is paid to the rela-
tive growth rates of each technology. An additional point of
interest in this configuration is that it includes three equilib-
ria, (0.4912, 0.2686), (0.8974, 0) and (0, 0.6220), but the one
that involves both technologies coexisting is unstable. As a
result, only one survives in any stable equilibrium.
Figure 4 presents our last scenario (p1 = 0.5, p2 = 5.2, q1 =
Figure 2: Effects of price changes on diffusion dynamics
Figure 3: On the impact of initial penetration
0.3 and q2 = 9.6), which illustrates yet another possible be-
havior for technology adoption. The figure shows that de-
pending on the initial penetration of technology 1, the equi-
librium sees either the survival of only technology 2, albeit
at a relatively low penetration (around 0.5), or the coexis-
tence of both technologies with a combined penetration of
a 100%. Both the differences in eventual penetration and
the presence of a sharp demarcation line between the two
regions are of interest. This is an instance, where the suf-
ficient initial penetration of technology 1 ensures not only
its survival, but preserves its ability to continue serving the
needs of the “low end” of the market, which the better but
pricier technology 2 cannot satisfy.
Figure 4: Coexistence vs. market penetration
6. CONCLUSION
The model developed in this paper is a first step towards
better understanding what affects the outcome of compe-
tition between an incumbent network technology and an
entrant. It accounts for network externalities and hetero-
geneity in how individual users make technology adoption
decisions, and captures both adoption dynamics and their
eventual outcome. In spite of the model’s relative simplic-
ity, it revealed various issues of potential interest in assessing
the likelihood of success of a new networking technology
There are many directions in which this initial work can
and should be extended, and we mention a few. A first is to
include gateways or converters that offer some level of com-
patibility between the two technologies. Another less obvi-
ous extension involves developing pricing strategies. These
could be static and seek to identify the optimal timing and
pricing of the new technology to maximize profit1. Even
more interesting are dynamic pricing strategies to maximize
the odds of survival or profit of each technology.
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